


湖南大学学报（自然科学版）
Journal of Hunan University (Natural Sciences)

第 50 卷 第 5 期
2023 年 5 月

Available online at <http://jonuns.com/index.php/journal/index>

Vol. 50 No. 5
May 2023

Open Access Article

 <https://doi.org/10.55463/issn.1674-2974.50.5.10>

Inconsistency in Implementing General Government Affairs in Bekasi City (Implementing the Program of National Vigilance and Facilitation of Social Conflict Resolution 2015-2022)

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Received: February 13, 2023 / Revised: March 16, 2023 / Accepted: April 7, 2023 / Published: May 31, 2023

Abstract: One of the challenges in managing central and regional government relations in Indonesia is maintaining the unity of the state goals within the framework of a unitary state. General government affairs are a form of policy implemented by the government of the Republic of Indonesia to address this challenge. This study aimed to analyze the implementation of the policy of general government affairs in local government through an analysis of implementing the Program of National Vigilance and Facilitation of Social Conflict Resolution by the Municipal Government of Bekasi. This study employed a qualitative approach with an investigative design and included, as the primary data, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with stakeholders. Then, a review of government literature and documents relevant to the theme of this research provided the secondary data. The study results showed that implementing general government affairs in Bekasi City was not going well. The disharmony in policy formulation and inconsistency in policy implementation, both from the content dimension and the context of policy implementation, caused the affairs that were not running well in Bekasi City. Future research can use the findings of this study as an initial assumption to see the implementation of general government affairs in all local governments in Indonesia.

Keywords: policy, implementation, general government affairs.

勿加泗市执行一般政府事务的不一致（执行《2015-2022 年国家警戒和促进社会冲突解决方案》）

摘要：在印度尼西亚管理中央和地方政府关系的挑战之一是在单一国家的框架内保持国家目标的统一。一般政府事务是印度尼西亚共和国政府为应对这一挑战而实施的一种政策形式。本研究旨在通过分析勿加泗市政府实施全国警戒和促进社会冲突解决计划的情况，分析地方政府一般政府事务政策的实施情况。本研究采用定性方法和调查设计，并作为主要数据包括与利益相关者的深入访谈和焦点小组讨论。然后，对与本研究主题相关的政府文献和文件的回顾提供了二手数据。研究结果表明，勿加泗市一般政府事务的实施进展不顺利。政策制定的不协调和政策执行的不一致，无论是从内容维度还是政策执行的脉络，都造成了勿加

泗市的辦事不順。未來的研究可以使用本研究的結果作為初步假設，以了解印度尼西亞所有地方政府對廣義政府事務的實施情況。

关键词：政策、實施、一般政府事務。

1. Introduction

The implementation of decentralization in Indonesia has provided a positive impact on people's lives in the regions [1], both in the health sector [2], [3], education [4], [5], and development of local identity [6], [7]. However, decentralization also harms development and society in the regions because of political competition that has implications for poverty [8], corruption [9], and mismanagement in decentralization in the regions [10]–[13].

The principle of deconcentration exists as a catalyst for the weakness of decentralization that aims to maintain state cohesion by giving some authority to the regions in an administrative, not in a political form [12], [14]–[18]. If state cohesion relates to general government (PUM) affairs, a country's national security is an important theme to discuss [19]–[21]. The disruption to state resilience can lead to conflict, so a system of assigning functions to the regions is needed in the form of a national vigilance system and conflict resolution, including power, time, scale, and connectivity between the center and the regions [22].

PUM affairs/policies are matters handled by the President as the Head of Government of the Republic of Indonesia and, in practice, are delegated to regional heads (Governors and Regents/Mayors) with the assistance of vertical institutions that perform the functions of PUM affairs [23]. These affairs care of the areas of nationalism, democratic politics, national unity, and conflict resolution in the regions. PUM affairs in conflict resolution are implemented in the Program of Implementation National Vigilance and Facilitation Social Conflict Resolution (PKNFPKS). The legal basis for implementing the PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS is the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 23 of 2014 (the Law of RI No. 23/2014) concerning the Regional Government. With the deconcentration of PUM affairs, the national vigilance system and conflict management at the central and regional levels can be integrated [21], [24].

Interestingly, several academics see this as an effort to recentralize central-regional relations in Indonesia [18], [25], [26]. This policy places the head of the autonomous region as the administrative executor in the implementation of PUM affairs in Indonesia. This is interesting to study in the context of the dual role of the head of an autonomous region as the recipient of a mandate from the community to fulfill political promises in his area, and on the other hand as a

representative of the central government in performing PUM affairs. The emphasis is on how the mayor/regent can create political stability, national unity, and tolerance; develop national insights; and eliminate seeds/potentials of conflicts that exist at the regional level.

In its ninth year since the promulgation of the Law of RI No. 23/2014, cases of social conflict are still occurring in Indonesian territory. One of the metropolitan cities that received attention to social conflict issues is Bekasi. Based on the data on the number of conflict potentials of Regencies/Cities of West Java Province 2017-2022, Bekasi City and Bogor City are buffer cities of the capital city with the highest level of conflict potential compared to other capital cities. The highest potential for conflict events in Bekasi City occurred between 2019 and 2021, with 75 potential conflict incidents during that period [27].

Therefore, this theme was interesting to study by analyzing the PUM policy at the autonomous region level. The discourse on public government was mainly carried out at the provincial level [12], [28]–[30]. The discourse focusing on autonomous regions (cities/regencies) has examined several technical policy aspects of local government [10], [17], [31], [32].

Based on the cluster analysis above, this study focused on analyzing the implementation of PUM affairs at the local government level by taking a case study of Implementing the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City in the 2015–2022 period. Thus, the primary questions in this study were:

- Research Question 1 (RQ1): How was implementing the PUM affairs policy and the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City in 2015–2022?

- Research Question 2 (RQ2): How was the position of the Mayor of Bekasi in the Implementation of the Deconcentration Policy on PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS in 2015–2022?

To answer these questions, we elaborated on the implementation of the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City using a qualitative method by focusing on the contents of policy and implementation divided into five parts.

In the second part of the literature study, we explain the relationship between policy content and the context of policy implementation complemented by the concept of deconcentration. The third part shows the method of analysis and data collection. In section four, we present the results and discussion in the form of content analysis and the context of implementing the

PKNFPKS policy in Bekasi City. Finally, section five of this article presents conclusions summarized from this study.

2. Literature Review

2.1. The Implementation of Public Policy

Public policy is a decision made by the state (government) as a strategy to create the goals to be achieved by the government of a country [33]–[35]. The success of a public policy can be seen in how the government controls its implementation. A policy supported by the highest authority is not necessarily effective because it could be that the implementing bureaucracy at the lower level (street-level bureaucrats) is unable or unwilling to implement it because of constraints at their level [36]–[38].

Therefore, the implementation of public policy is the activity of implementing or completing a public policy that has been determined/approved by using means (tools) to achieve policy objectives [34], [39], [40]. Actions, perceptions, interactions, and reactions of the stakeholders of policy implementation demonstrate the success of policy implementation [38], [39], [41]–[43]. Thus, policy implementation is a "policy-action continuum," in which interactive processes and negotiations occur all the time between those who seek to implement the policy and those whose actions depend on the policy implementation [35], [44], [45].

2.2. Contents and Contexts of Implementing the Deconcentration Policy of the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City

The "policy-action continuum" in public policy implementation can be understood by analyzing the political and administrative processes to achieve the goals of the policy [37], [46]. Analysis of policy implementation involves sorting out the content of the policy and the context of its implementation [37], [46]–[48].

Policy content is the influence of interests, types of benefits, expected change, decision-making positions, program implementers, and resource commitments [49]. Policy content is the substance or "objective details" to achieve a policy [50]. The policy content is then implemented into a policy action strongly influenced by the implementation context of the environment [35], [37], [51]. Thus, the context of policy implementation is an essential part of the analysis of the policy implementation. The implementation context involves three dimensions:

- How the powers, interests, and strategies of the actors are involved [52];
- The characteristics of institutions in translating policies [53];
- Compliance and response of implementers

[54].

Therefore, an analysis of the policy content and context of the implementation of PUM affairs (PKNFPKS) in Bekasi City involves several dimensions, namely:

- *Elite/leadership:* An analysis involved leadership from the perspective of political policy implementation and the administrative environment. Leadership can be studied through political and administrative actions taken by the regional head of Bekasi City in translating the PKNFPKS policy in Bekasi City. From a political viewpoint, it can be seen from the position of the regional head as the head of an autonomous region was directly elected by his constituents, as well as from an administrative environment perspective. It can be seen from how the regional head interacts with stakeholders in implementing government affairs (which are the President's affairs) in Bekasi City and regardless of the political promises of the regional heads to constituents [37], [44], [52], [55], [56];

- *The implementation and target of the program:* An analysis involved administrative actions that support the implementation of PUM affairs by looking at the achievement of the PKNFPKS against the set targets. This analysis was also carried out on the scope of implementation of the program [37], [57]–[59], so to see the outcome of the implementation of the policy.

- *Resources:* This indicator was analyzed on the utilization of resources (budget and human) that support the implementation of the policy of deconcentration of government affairs in Bekasi City [35], [37], [48], [60], [61];

- *Institutional/organizational aspect:* This aspect looked at institutions affected by the delegation of government affairs. The analysis looked at the characteristics and activities of the institution and its relationship with other institutions [9], [30], [37], [45], [53], [62].




Fig. 1 Flow analysis of the program of the PKNFPKS implementation in the Bekasi Government

Fig. 1 describes the interaction network of actors in implementing the PKNFPKS deconcentration policy in Bekasi City. The pattern of relations and interactions of these actors influences one another in implementing a policy. It was the power and interests of each actor that

played a role in which direction policy would be implemented [37], [57], [63], [64]. Fig. 2 explains the interaction of implementing the PKNFPKS deconcentration policy in Bekasi City.




Fig. 2 Interaction network of the implementation of the PKNFPKS deconcentration policy

From the explanation above, the initial assumption was that implementing the PUM affairs policy and the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City was not running well. This assumption referred to cases of potential conflict that occurred in Bekasi City, which was one of the highest cities in West Java Province [27].

3. Methods

3.1. Research Design

This study analyzed the implementation of PUM affairs in Bekasi City through implementing the PKNFPKS. The design of the study was exploratory, using a qualitative approach. This study used a participatory approach, conducting in-depth interviews and FGDs with informants involved in implementing PUM affairs in Bekasi City. Determining the number and elements of informants was through a purposive technique, namely regarding specific considerations based on criteria for position, role, competence, and involvement relevant to becoming research informants. The determination of informants for this study was also carried out using a consultative and confirmative approach according to the position of each informant [65], [66]. The search for informants also used the snowball technique based on the need for data mining in the field [67].

The informants were divided into three groups: policy-making informants, implementing informants (policy implementation), and academic informants. From the three groups of informants, in-depth interviews were conducted concerning the theory of content and the context of policy implementation [37].

3.2. Data Collection

The primary data collection used research in the field conducted by the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs and the Municipal Government of Bekasi. The Ministry of Home Affairs (Kemendagri) of the Republic of Indonesia took part in developing policies

on PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS. Meanwhile, the Municipal Government of Bekasi City (Pemkot) was the implementer of the PUM affair policy and the PKNFPKS. To collect the data, the researcher conducted in-depth interviews with informants, FGDs, and engaged in observations [68]. In-depth interviews used interview guidelines with informants. The informant was the head of PUM affairs in the city of Bekasi, while the observations involved were carried out directly by working for the Bekasi City Government in 2015-2022.

The second source was secondary data referred to scientific literature, official government documents on research themes, and other sources of information [69]. Therefore, the secondary data for this article came from books and journals related to policy implementation and regulatory documents and performance report documents on PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS sourced from the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs and the Municipal Government of Bekasi.

3.3. Data Analysis

The analysis of the qualitative data was carried out by organizing the data into patterns and categorization. This activity aimed to find answers to research questions and assumptions that were developed into new assumptions to answer research questions. Data reduction, presentation, and conclusion/verification followed the analysis [70].

4. Results and Discussion

4.1. Summary of Policy: The Position of PUM Affairs and PKNFPKS in Deconcentration

The concept of PUM affairs/policies in Indonesia departed from the principles of the Republic of Indonesia as a unitary state by placing the central government as the highest authority over all government affairs in the country [23]. Through PUM policies/affairs as stipulated in the Law of RI No. 23/2014, the central government would directly control downwards related issues of PUM affairs in the regions [18], [21], [71]. Based on the Law of RI No. 23/2014, PUM affairs belong to the President of the Republic of Indonesia, delegating their implementation to all regional heads in Indonesia.

PUM affairs were government affairs that did not include absolute affairs re excluded from concurrent affairs. This matter was a residual not fully divided between central and regional government institutions [23], [72], [73]. This matter included coordination between government agencies, fostering insight and national unity, political stability, conflict management, fostering peace, and public order.




Fig. 3 Model of division of regional central affairs based on the Law of RI No. 23/2014

Therefore, implementing PUM affairs used the principle of deconcentration. Articles 1 and 4 of the Law of RI No. 23/2014 contain the principle of implementation in the form of deconcentration [21]. Deconcentration was the delegation of administrative authority through granting administrative power from central officials to central officials or representatives in the regions [74]–[76]. In other words, the delegation was only in the form of giving administrative control to the Mayor of Bekasi as the executor of PUM policies and affairs in Bekasi City. Deconcentration did not give political authority to policy implementers [75], [77]–[81].

One of the derivative forms of the PUM affair policy was the PKNFPKS. The position of the Bekasi City Government in implementing this program was only administrative executors without strategic and political authority with the aim of flexibility in implementing early vigilance and conflict prevention in the region [15], [76], [82], [83].

Table 1 Positions of the Mayor of Bekasi City in the Law of RI No. 23/2014 [23]

Mayor of Bekasi	
Head of the Autonomous Region	Head of the Administrative Region
Decentralization principle Political and strategic authority	Deconcentration principle Administrative and routine authority (non-strategic)
Interests—to realize the vision and mission (political promises during the campaign) in the hope that the voters will be satisfied	Interests—to conduct the PUM affairs policy based on the standard and target established by the delegation of authority
The use of budget sourced from the City of Bekasi (APBD)	The use of a budget sourced from the central government (APBN)
Accountability to the voting public (a constituent)	Hierarchical accountability to the delegation of authority

According to the Director of the National Vigilance of the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs, the reason for withdrawing the authority for PUM affairs from local governments in the Law of RI No. 23/2014 was “because local governments were not optimal in carrying out PUM affairs and national vigilance in the regions. The withdrawal of this matter to the center aimed to synergize the implementation of PUM affairs and national vigilance in the regions in one chain of command” (TSH).

Before enacting the Law of RI No. 23/2014, the practice of national vigilance and resolution of social conflicts in the regions was applied by the regions under the principle of decentralization. As a result, the implementation of early vigilance and resolution of social conflicts in the regions was not optimal. According to data submitted by the Director General for Politics and Public Administration of the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs, several cases of social conflict occurred during this period, which reached regional and national levels [84]. Most of these social conflicts are in the spheres of ideology, politics, socio-culture, economy, ethnicity, religion, and race [85]. Two provinces had the largest cumulative number of social conflict cases in Indonesia, namely, Papua and West Java Provinces [85], and Bekasi City was one of the cities in West Java with quite a high potential for conflict [27]. The above agrees with [86], which stated that the withdrawal of PUM affairs to the central government through the Law of RI No. 23/2014 was the state's way of addressing the weaknesses of conflict resolution and social vulnerability carried out by regional governments.

4.2. Implementation of the Policy

From the side of the Government of Bekasi City, the withdrawal of PUM affairs by the central government had an impact on the mayor's dual assignment as the leader of the government in Bekasi City. As the head of an autonomous region, the mayor had strategic and political authority. However, as the head of the administrative area for PUM affairs in Bekasi City, the mayor had limited authority and was only an administrator with non-political discretionary powers. For budget accountability and performance, it was also similarly applied. For implementing development decentralized to Bekasi City, performance and budget accountability must be reported to its constituents (voting community) through an annual meeting with the Bekasi City Parliament. The accountability for the implementation of PUM affairs was reported to the President of the Republic of Indonesia through the Governor of West Java [18], [71].

The key was in the interests [32], [37] and pragmatism [87] of the implementation of the PKNFPKS in the regions by paying attention to the contents of policy and contexts of the environment

where it was implemented [35], [37], [51]. In implementing the policy, every elite had an interest and wanted to benefit from the implemented policy, meaning that there was a contest between the Bekasi City elite (Mayor) and the state (President) regarding the implementation of the PUM affairs policy and the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City. The situation became dangerous when elites at different scales had conflicting interests and strategies [30], [32], [37], which could lead to policy incoherence and disharmony [88], [89], which in the end would hinder or fail the implementation of the PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City.

4.2.1. Contents of Policy: Influence of Interests

Director of National Vigilance of the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs expressed the interest of the central government. According to him, the withdrawal of the management of PUM affairs from the local government to the central government aimed to maintain the balance of regional autonomy within the framework of a unitary state.

“Regional autonomy was not decreased; in fact, it was expanded with a clearer portion. Regarding PUM affairs, the main objective was to maintain national unity within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The central government saw the “solidity” of a country in the previous policy regime, which was not very solid” (TSH).

The Council of Experts at the Indonesian Pancasila Ideology Development Agency (BPIP) also conveyed the same. The political steps of policy taken by the central government by withdrawing PUM affairs from the center to the regions could also be interpreted as an attempt by the central government to create cohesion in the management of public administration.

“By strengthening citizens’ understanding of Pancasila, the National Insight, the 1945 Constitution, the Republic of Indonesia and Bhineka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) through policies on government affairs” (DD).

Unfortunately, at the implementation stage, several problems occurred.

First, since the publication of the Law of RI No. 23/2014 until 2022, not a single technical policy has been issued to regulate the implementation of PUM affairs down to the regional level.

“The danger was that the central government through the Ministry of Home Affairs (Kemendagri) has not issued a single derivative policy that explains how to implement PUM affairs at the regional level. The recent regulations were only temporary ones....” (SW).

The central government, through several temporary regulations, forced the regional government (Bekasi City) to perform these affairs using the resources owned by each regional government [90]–[94].

Second, when referring to the Law of RI No. 23/2014 concerning the implementation of PUM affairs in the regions, this matter was a matter for the central government carried out at the regional level as deconcentration. Thus, the legal basis for regulating PUM affairs in the regions must have the principles and objectives of PUM affairs. Because this was not the case, through these temporary regulations, the central government burdened the implementation of this matter on regional governments, meaning that there was inconsistency from the central government in translating and implementing PUM affairs in the regions.

Third, the inconsistency between the policies on PUM affairs contained in the Law of RI No. 23/2014 and its explanatory regulations has caused disharmony in implementing PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS in the regions. This disharmony occurred because of the different interests of the regime that issued the Law of RI No. 23/2014 and the regime that implemented the Law of RI No. 23/2014.

“The regime of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) was a regime that had an interest in the central-regional synergy in managing PUM affairs to reduce incidents of conflict in the regions. The management of PUM affairs under President SBY was a priority on the policy agenda. In the regime of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), infrastructure development was a top priority for development. Therefore, the implementation of affairs and programs that were not closely related to infrastructure development priorities was being redefined. This has led to a change in perspective regarding the implementation of PUM affairs in the regions” (P3).

Finally, this disharmony affected changes in the way of implementing PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City. The Government of Bekasi City caught the central government's inconsistency as a form of transferring responsibility from the central government to the government of Bekasi City. The Head of the National Unity and Political Agency of Bekasi City expressed this argument:

“In my opinion, the management of PUM affairs in the regions, especially this program, was not serious. If we looked at the mandate of the law, this matter was actually in the hands of the president. However, in practice, it is not like that. Everything was left to the regions” (CS).

The logical consequence of this situation was that the government of Bekasi City performing PUM affairs in its territory was only normative. This could be seen in the document of the Bekasi City Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMD), which did not prioritize budget and assets for the implementation of PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS [95]. The Mayor of Bekasi also did not place employees according to the needs of implementing PUM affairs in Bekasi City. The field

findings show:

“So far, there have been several obstacles... First, it was the budget problem... The Municipal Government of Bekasi did not prioritize PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS...The second obstacle was the problem of human resources...PUM affairs were conceptual and thinking matters...So we needed human resources with qualifications following these matters... So was the placement of positions” (D).

The explanation given by the officials of Bekasi City Kesbangpol above could be assumed as the

interest of the government of Bekasi City in addressing the inconsistencies of the central government. The Municipal Government of Bekasi did not make PUM affairs a regional priority in urban development. Thus, the implementation by officials reflected the leader's attitude in responding to a policy [96]. In the context of implementing PUM affairs in Bekasi City, the position of the Head of the Kesbangpol Agency of Bekasi City in managing PUM affairs in his area was a reflection of the Mayor of Bekasi regarding the management of PUM affairs in Bekasi City.

Table 2 Condition of the disharmony of policy contents in implementing PUM affairs and PKNFPKS in Bekasi City ([90], [92]–[94], [97], [98], with the data processing by the authors)

No.	Scope/Indicator	Substantive Policy Contents (Mandate of Law of RI No. 23/2014)	Technical-administrative policy content in Bekasi City (Existing Condition)
1	The principle of implementing	Conducted by the Central Government	Conducted by Regional Government
2	The cost of implementing PUM affairs	State income expenditure budget (APBN)	Regional Revenue Expenditure Budget (APBD) of Bekasi City
3	Regulation	Government Regulation (PP) explaining PUM affairs	PP 18/2016, Minister of Home Affairs Regulation 11/2019, 050-3708/2020, SE Minister of Home Affairs 120/ 253/ Sj/ 2015, SE Minister of Home Affairs 060/ 3711/ SJ/ 2019—derivation of concurrent affairs.
4	Program priority	A priority because it is the President’s affairs in the region	Not a priority because there was a regulatory vacuum and it was left to the regions
5	Interest	President’s interest (NKRI)	Bekasi Mayor’s or district head interest

4.2.2. Contents of the Policy: Implementation of PKNFPKS in Bekasi City

The struggle of interests in implementing PUM affairs in Bekasi City has failed in implementing the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City. The PKNFPKS was a derivative program of PUM affairs as stipulated in the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation (Permendagri) 90/2019, which was later clarified through the Minister of Home Affairs Decree (Kepmendagri) 050-3708/2020 [92], [98]. The PKNFPKS carried out activities related to intelligence and national vigilance in the regions, including Bekasi City. According to the Mayor of Bekasi, this program functioned as a home for activities related to early vigilance and intelligence in Bekasi City.

“PKNFPKS was a home for any activities related to the early vigilance and intelligence in Bekasi City” (TAT).

To conduct this program, the Mayor of Bekasi gave a task to the Kesbangpol Agency of Bekasi City to run and coordinate the implementation of the program for institutions involved in the works of early vigilance and facilitation of social conflict resolution in Bekasi City.

Unfortunately, the tug-of-war between the central government and the Mayor of Bekasi has created problems in implementing this program in Bekasi City. First, referring to the Law of RI No. 23/2014, the PKNFPKS should be implemented with state budget funding. However, funding for this program was from

the regional budget (APBD) of Bekasi City. The central government formally forced the regions to finance PUM affairs and their derivative programs by using regulations that did not substantially represent the principle of deconcentration [90], [92], [98]. Second, the central government made direct appointments for the Bekasi City regional apparatus to perform PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City. This order was in Permendagri No. 11 of 2019 [93]. This situation shows that the central government has burdened the Bekasi City government in implementing PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City.

“PUM Affairs and PKNFPKS were truly implemented by the regional government... No deconcentration institution carried out this matter in Bekasi City... Everything was left to the regions” (SG).




Fig. 4 Implementation of the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City

Due to the inconsistency of the central government, the government of Bekasi City acted pragmatically in

the implementation of PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City [87]. These pragmatic attitudes are as follows:

1. They did not perform policy development from a technical perspective regarding early vigilance and facilitation of social conflict resolution in the regions. In fact, as the head of the autonomous region and concurrently the head of the administrative area for PUM affairs in Bekasi City, the Mayor of Bekasi was able to do this;

2. *Priority scale*: The central government did not provide an implementing budget sourced from the APBN. The Municipal Government of Bekasi has not prioritized the PKNFPKS in the Bekasi City APBD as mandated by temporary regulations issued by the central government. The PKNFPKS has become a no-man program in which the central government and the Bekasi City government shifted their responsibility to each other. If a recapitulation of the amount of the budget was done for the implementation of the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City, it would reveal the fact that the amount of the budget has decreased every year.

Table 3 Recapitulation of the budget of the PKNFPKS from 2015 to 2021 (Documents of SAKIP of Bekasi City of 2015-2021 fiscal years, with the data processing by the authors)

No.	Programs	Fiscal year	The total budget (Rp)
1	PKNFPKS	2015	1,551,000,000
		2016	1,682,000,000
		2017	1,260,000,000
		2018	590,000,000
		2019	590,000,000
		2020	590,000,000
		2021	600,000,000

They did not improve the quality of the apparatus implementing the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City. The Mayor of Bekasi removed activities aimed at increasing the apparatus for the national vigilance of Bekasi City. The placement of personnel for the organizers of the PKNFPKS did not consider qualifications and competence.

“...The next obstacle was the human resources... PUM affairs was a matter of concept and thought... so, it required human resources with the qualification related to this affair... so was the placement of the position of office ...” (D).

4.2.3. Contexts of the Implementation: Executor’s Attitudes

The pragmatic attitudes of the Mayor of Bekasi could also be seen in the implementation of the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City.

First, PUM Affairs transferred into a practical political area in maintaining the political support structure for the Mayor of Bekasi. This argument referred to the formation of regional forums initiated by the Ministry of Home Affairs but did not use the framework outlined by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

In the political-administrative context (Politico-Administrative Context), benefits influenced the choices about allocating resources and the consequences for groups/individuals in society [37]. In this case, the Mayor of Bekasi formed the Community’s Early Vigilance Forum (FKDM) of Bekasi City as a community association whose function was to assist the Bekasi City Government in performing early detection activities in the area. The formation of this forum uses the basis of Permendagri Number 02 of 2018 concerning Regional Early Vigilance [97]. Interestingly, forming the FKDM was based on the direct appointment of the mayor. There was no mechanism for selecting its members, what qualifications were necessary to become members of the forum, and what targets were to be achieved by this organization. This situation justified the argument that the Mayor of Bekasi took advantage of the policies on PUM affairs set by the central government to bring them into the realm of practical politics for the City of Bekasi.

Second, using PUM affairs to perform symbolic/ceremonial activities regularly accompanied by large-scale mass gatherings of people in public places.

“...This approach gave the impression that the implementation of PUM affairs in Bekasi City was a political show from the Mayor of Bekasi in the form of the symbolism of the masses of supporters. This situation explained that the Mayor of Bekasi took benefits in implementing the policy” (AS).

This implementation method explained that the Mayor of Bekasi did not apply the flow of policy implementation in a disciplined manner based on the authority granted by law.

Third, increasing the amount of the budget for grant allocations for the Community Forums and Organizations (Ormas) in Bekasi City without being matched by strengthening the PKNFPKS from a budgetary perspective. The argument for increasing the allocation of grants for these forums and mass organizations was to build community participatory awareness in implementing the PKNFPKS. Unfortunately, this method was contrary to the rules in public administration, which prioritized primary affairs/programs over supporting programs. The grant program, a supporting aspect in achieving the main performance target, defeated the PKNFPKS, the primary policy in implementing PUM affairs.

Table 4 Comparison of the budget allocation of the PKNFPKS and grant program of PUM affairs in Bekasi City (Documents of SAKIP of Bekasi City of 2015-2021 fiscal years, with the data processing by the authors)

No.	Fiscal year (TA)	The allocation of the grant for forum and community organization (Rp)	Allocation for the PKNFPKS (Rp)
1	2015	578,000,000	1,551,000,000
2	2016	2,705,600,000	1,682,000,000

No.	Fiscal year (TA)	The allocation of the grant for forum and community organization (Rp)	Allocation for the PKNFPKS (Rp)
3	2017	2,120,000,000	1,260,000,000
4	2018	1,250,000,000	590,000,000
5	2019	1,250,000,000	590,000,000
6	2020	2,000,000,000	590,000,000
7	2021	2,590,000,000	600,000,000
Total		12,493,600,000	6,863,000,000

4.2.4. Contexts of the Implementation: Targets, Institutions, and Administrative Officials

Problems with the implementation of PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City could also be explained from the dimensions of the implementation context. This dimension of the implementation context describes the institutions and apparatus implementing the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City. The work unit of the government of Bekasi City implementing the PKNFPS Program was the Kesbangpol Agency led by a head of the second-echelon agency. Through a set of interim regulations from the central government [90], [93], [94], the central government "requested" the regions (The Government of Bekasi City) to perform PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS in their territory using regional resources. With a temporary regulation, the Kesbangpol Agency of Bekasi City, which is a regional apparatus, was appointed to perform PUM affairs in Bekasi City.

As a result, the Kesbangpol Agency, the agency implementing the PCNPFC in Bekasi City, has two targets. The first target came from the central government through the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs. The second target came from the Mayor of Bekasi as the head of the autonomous region and administrative area for PUM affairs in Bekasi City. This situation was surely a "dilemma" for the Kesbangpol Agency in the context of conflicting interests. If viewed from the sources of PUM affairs policies contained in the Law of RI No. 23/2014, the situation that occurred in Bekasi City was the impact of inconsistencies in translating the Law of RI No.23/2014 regarding the implementation of PUM affairs in the regions. If it was consistent with the mandate of the Law of RI No. 23/2014, the institutions that carried out PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City were vertical agencies as stated in article 25 paragraph 3 of the Law of RI No. 23/2014, not local government organizations.

Therefore, this inconsistency has caused the Kesbangpol Agency of Bekasi City to be at the intersection of the interests of the central government and the Mayor of Bekasi. The central government did this by using "temporary regulations" as a tool to keep its policy interests implemented by the Kesbangpol Agency. The Mayor of Bekasi used apparatus

arrangements and the proportion of the budget at the Kesbangpol Agency as a tool to direct PUM affairs in Bekasi City.




Fig. 5 Flow of institutional relations of the Kesbangpol Agency of Bekasi

The findings in the field showed that the Mayor of Bekasi dominated the competition of interests in the implementation of PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS through the regulatory power of the apparatus and the proportion of the budget it owned. Through apparatus arrangements, the Mayor of Bekasi placed administrative officials (ASN) who could not perform PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS according to the direction of the central government. The impact was that the Kesbangpol Agency of Bekasi City could not meet the performance targets that had been set.

"Related to the resources of the Kesbangpol Agency... it's as if the apparatus placed here were parked human resources" (ES).

The budget politics of the Mayor of Bekasi also did not put PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS as regional priorities. As a result, the Kesbangpol Agency, as an institution implementing the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City, did not have the budgetary resources to meet the targets given to the agency. These two things were those that provided incentives for the failure of the ASN and Kesbangpol institutions to perform PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City.

"PUM affairs in the Municipal Government of Bekasi were attached to the mindset that this was the affairs of the central government... Therefore, the Municipal Government of Bekasi did not prioritize these PUM matters.... Although these PUM affairs were also attached to regional and sub-district heads..., still, the PKNFPKS was not a priority" (D).

4.2.5. Contexts of the Implementation: Effects

The inconsistency in the implementation of PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City had implications for the emergence of several social conflict incidents in the city. Several conflict cases in Bekasi City were exposed to the international level. Table 5 shows the events of social conflict that occurred in Bekasi City during 2014–2022, with a classification based on issues that caused social conflicts.

Table 5 Recapitulation of social conflict cases based on the source of the problem (Documents of LAKIP of Bekasi City (2014-2022), RPJMD of Bekasi City, and Report of Early Vigilance Team of Bekasi City, with the data processed by the authors)

Cases of government affairs	The number of cases	Impacts of cases	The level of cases	Period
Religious harmony	7	Fatalities and injuries	2 internationally exposed cases; 1 national case; 1 regional case; 3 local cases	2014–2022
National unity	6	Fatalities and injuries	4 regional cases; 2 local cases	2014–2022
Democratic politics	5	Injuries	4 national cases; 1 regional case	2014–2022
Social cases during COVID-19	3	Injuries	3 regional cases	2020–2022

According to the Indonesian Ministry of Religion (Kemenag), cases of social conflict that occurred in Bekasi City were caused by the failure of the Government of Bekasi City to perform early vigilance and conflict prevention. The Municipal Government of Bekasi did not have a technical mechanism for the PKNFPKS that could be used to resolve social conflicts in its territory in a structured manner. Proactive attitude, assertiveness, and consistency, as well as shared perceptions regarding conflict prevention from government officials, caused failure in building conflict early warning and response systems [99]. The arguments put forward by one of the community leaders of Bekasi City reinforced this opinion:

“The PKNFPKS was only a formality tool for

regional leadership elites in exposing potential vulnerabilities in urban areas, but the follow-up to the next stage seemed to be floating...The Kesbangpol Agency was also part of that process” (AS).

“The heads of regional had political interests... Therefore, the mayor took a middle path to make peace without seeing the potential for conflict to its roots, which was likely to recur” (AS).

4.2.6. Implementation of Policy: Contents of Policy and Contexts of Implementation

Based on the analysis done in the earlier parts, the implementation of PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City could be elaborated as follows:

Table 6 Implementation of PUM affairs and PKNFPKS in Bekasi City (2015-2022)

No.	Scope	The Policy of PUM Affairs: The Law of RI No.23/2014	Implementation of the Policy of PUM Affairs in Bekasi City
1	Contents of policy		
A	Influence of interests	Purely the interests of the central government for the nation-state in the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia	Two interests were, namely the interest of the central government and regional heads (the Mayor of Bekasi)
B	Deconcentration of the PKNFPKS	The implementation of the program with deconcentration was through vertical agencies and APBN financing.	The implementation was by the Municipal Government of Bekasi through regional apparatuses with APBD funding.
2	Contexts of the Implementation		
A	The attitude of the executors	The attitudes of policy implementers were "perpendicular" under the direction of the central government.	The attitude of the executors was not "perpendicular".
B	Administrative officials	Apparatus who headed vertical agencies (deconcentration)	Regional apparatus who headed regional apparatus (decentralization)
C	Competence standards of administrative officials	merit and tiered	Various with varying degrees of quality
D	Institution of the executors	Vertical agencies (deconcentration)	Regional apparatus
E	Resource of the implementation	The central apparatus in the regions financed by the state budget	Regional apparatus funded by the regional budget. Periodic upgrades were not carried out for the apparatus implementing the PUM affairs and Regional Early Vigilance.
F	Standard of performance	One level (source) of performance standards from the business owner (central government)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Three levels (sources) of performance standards exist. The first was from the central government. The second was from the policy of the regional head. The third was regional apparatus technical policies (accommodating the central government and regional heads); • None of the performance targets set at the three levels has been achieved.

5. Conclusion

Based on the description of the research results

above, we can conclude that the analysis of the implementation of PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS in

Bekasi City, which was carried out through participatory studies by conducting in-depth interviews and FGDs with informants involved in implementing PUM affairs in Bekasi City, has not gone well. From the dimension of policy content, inconsistency between policy sources (the Law of RI No. 23/2014) and derivative policies as the basis for implementing PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City has caused disharmony in the implementation area. This regulatory disharmony has caused the implementation of PUM affairs and the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City to become an area of tug-of-war between the central government as the business owner and the Mayor of Bekasi as the head of the autonomous region, who was also the administrative head of PUM affairs in Bekasi City. This conflict of interest had implications for mistakes in planning and preparing budget standards for the PKNFPKS in Bekasi City.

The analysis of the implementation context also showed that the central government was abusing power by forcing Bekasi City to implement the PKNFPKS, which should be implemented by the central government. On the other hand, the Mayor of Bekasi also took advantage of the disharmony in the implementation of regulations on PUM affairs to gain benefits for his political base. This was done by paying attention to mass organizations that could safeguard the political interests of the mayor through a grant program whose source of funding came from a reduction in the budget for the PKNFPKS. As a result, the PKNFPKS could not run well in Bekasi City.

We hope that the results of this research can provide information as a basis for consideration, support, and contribution of ideas to increase studies on the PKNFPKS. The results of the research recommendations obtained indicated that supervision is necessary because there are inconsistencies in policy implementation, both from the dimensions of the content and the context of policy implementation, which cause the non-running of affairs in the City of Bekasi.

Based on the researcher's direct experience in this research process, some limitations were experienced, and could be several factors that future researchers could pay more attention to, namely regarding the number of respondents.

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