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Communism Issues in Kompas Daily, Transformation from the Old Order to the New Order Era

Abie Besman^{1*}, Dadang Rahmat Hidayat¹, Atwar Bajari¹, Alois Moosmüller²

¹ Communication Studies, Padjadjaran University, Bandung, Indonesia

² Intercultural Communication and Cultural Anthropology, Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich, Munich, Germany

* Corresponding author: abie.besman@unpad.ac.id

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Abstract: The editorials of large national mass media naturally become a part of the history of political power transitions. Such is the case for Kompas Daily, one of the oldest mass media in Indonesia. Despite being banned nationally since 1966, communism is still a topic of discussion within media editorials. This research aims to present new evidence of the role of journalism in raising the issue of communism in the mass media during the regime transition from the Old Order to the New Order in Indonesia. This research uses the historiography method with a constructivist approach and found Kompas Daily editorial dynamics in responding to the issue of communism that occurred during the regime transition. The authors used data collected from the mass media, research studies, publications, online technology, interviews, and academic literature related to the communism issue in the Kompas Daily media practice, supported by a check-list for the classification of research materials, map of writing, and format of research notes. The study results show that when dealing with power, Kompas Daily practices swing journalism that adapts to developing situations and conditions. Swing media allows Kompas Daily to create a position that lets them maintain journalistic independence while remaining politically secure in accommodating the ruling regime.

Keywords: Kompas Daily, communism, old order, new order, swing media.

羅盤日報的共產主義問題，從舊秩序到新秩序時代的轉變

摘要：大型國家大眾媒體的社論自然成為政權更替歷史的一部分。羅盤日常的就是這種情況，它是印度尼西亞歷史最悠久的大眾媒體之一。儘管自1966年以來在全國範圍內被禁止，共產主義仍然是媒體社論中討論的話題。這項研究旨在提供新的證據，證明在印度尼西亞從舊秩序向新秩序的政權過渡期間，新聞業在大眾媒體中提出共產主義問題方面的作用。本研究使用具有建構主義方法的史學方法，發現羅盤日常的社論動態回應政權過渡期間發生的共產主義問題。作者在羅盤日常的媒體實踐中使用了從大眾媒體、研究、出版物、在線技術、訪談和與共產主義問題相關的學術文獻收集的數據，並輔以研究材料分類清單、地圖研究筆記的寫作和格式。研究結果表明，在處理權力問題時，羅盤日常的採用了適應發展情況



和條件的搖擺新聞。搖擺媒體讓羅盤日常的創造了一個位置，讓他們保持新聞獨立，同時在適應統治政權方面保持政治安全。

关键词：羅盤日報，共產主義，舊秩序，新秩序，搖擺不定的媒體。

1. Introduction

Kompas daily was born right at a time when the political conditions of the Republic of Indonesia were hot up, in mid-1965, during the most turbulent period in the history of Indonesia.

At that time, President Soekarno's power was on the verge of collapse, and the Indonesian press played a significant role. Back then, every political power had its own mass media. For example, the Indonesian National Party (INP) owns the Suluh Indonesia newspaper, the Indonesian Muslim Syuro Council (Masyumi) has the Abadi Daily, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) has Duta Komunitas, and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) has the Harian Rakjat and Warta Bhakti. In fact, the Indonesian National Army (TNI AD) also has its own newspaper, namely, the Angkatan Bersenjata and Berita Yudha [2].

In 1965, the Minister of Information, Major General Achmadi through a Ministerial Decree ordered that every mass media must be affiliated to and have the support of political parties or mass organizations that are members of the National Front (*Reference: The National Front is a mass organization founded in 1959. This organization unites all forms of national potential to support Soekarno's ideology, such as political parties, armed forces, and economic and socio-cultural policies. The National Front was excluded from the political cabinet but was still led by President Soekarno*).

Although some media are not directly affiliated with any parties, their journalism style is usually identical to the views and ideologies of the company leaders or editors. Several media of this type, such as the Merdeka newspaper, are inseparable from the ideology of B.M. Diah, Indonesia Raya led by Mochtar Lubis, and Pedomani daily led by Rosihan Anwar.

The Catholic Party founded Kompas Daily at the request of the Minister/Army Commander Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani (1962–1965) to counterbalance the dominance of the PKI, which controlled the mass media [27]. With this background, when it was published in 1965, Kompas Daily showed critical editorial and straightforward news especially toward the rulers who were indeed close to the PKI at that time.

This editorial can be observed in the writings of P.K. Ojong (1920–1980), one of the founders of Kompas Daily besides Jakob Oetama (1931–2020), in the Kompasiana column, which was published

regularly in the Kompas Daily at that time. According to Ojong, the function of the press is not to protect but to criticize those in power. The editorial style of Kompas was referred to as a representation of old-style journalism known as 'biting journalism' [2].

Still, according to Ahmad Arif, the editorial of Kompas Daily began to soften, especially after the emergence of the New Order, which carried out the repression of media freedom around the 1970s. P.K. Ojong finally stopped writing his critical thoughts in the Kompasiana rubric in 1971. The New Order also opened up business opportunities for media who were willing to cooperate with the government [1].

The most significant "support" from the government occurred in 1972, when Kompas Daily was no longer associated with the Catholic Party and the Kompasiana rubric was no longer published. Massive capital assistance from the state was given on November 25, 1972 amounting to 236 million rupiah [7], equaling to 11 billion rupiah in 2022-

After receiving the funds, Kompas as a media industry continues to improve and move toward a more professional company. Not only known as a newspaper company, Kompas also diversified their business in various supporting industries. These industries include printing, publishing, bookstores, and magazines. As a business entity, Kompas Group eventually developed beyond the mass media business, but also in the hotel business, event organizer and education.

According to Dhakidae, the early 1970s was the era of Kompas transformation into a professional media. At first, Kompas was widely known as media affiliated with the Catholic Party, the Army, and, to a certain extent with Soekarno's propaganda interests. Since the 70s, Kompas changed its management style. It became more inclusive and recruited journalists from various religious and ethnic backgrounds. However, the association of Kompas with Catholicism is still often misused to this day, and Kompas is often referred to as an acronym for *Pastor Command* or the Catholic Priest Order.

Kompas Daily survived and showed its existence through the Old Order regime. Through these periods, the challenges that must be passed by Kompas in conducting journalism activities in the Old Order regime, especially regarding the issue of communism, has never stopped filling discourse space in society, especially if it is related to the issue of transition of power between the Old Order and New Order.

The *article title* (editorial) is an official statement or opinion from a mass media editor on a problem in society. [17] explained that editorials were usually written by the chief editor of mass media, although it was possible that they were written by senior members of the editorial team. By using an argumentative and persuasive language, the *article title* influences and gives consideration to readers to believe and act in accordance with what the mass media wants.

The main ideas and thoughts of the Kompas Daily editorial can be observed from how the *article title* is written. The same applies to the issue of the PKI in the government of the Republic of Indonesia, which is the main source of this research.

What is written in this *article title* is historical evidence of how Kompas Daily practices discourse in covering the issue of communism. In accordance with what is stated in the Reality Construction Theory, media content is how the media constructs reality. Media content is a reality that is constructed by the editors of the mass media.

All *article titles* written also show how Kompas Daily views communism, which can be different in various aspects, both from socio-cultural, legal, political, and economic, and also depends on the context of the time in which the editorial is written. According to [12], this is a process of interpreting communism by the media and internalized by society. Thus, it can be stipulated that the meaning of communism contained in an editorial is the meaning produced by the sender of the message, in this case the Kompas Daily.

When discussing the issue of communism within the mass media, the army's successful efforts marked the collapse of the Old Order in putting the blame of the coup attempt on the PKI. Afterwards, the army continued the New Order campaign to eliminate communism and leftist thought in Indonesia. The new regime (New Order) emphasized the centrality of anti-communism ideas through indoctrination programs that operated through the media, workplace, and education system.

[13] explained that the New Order would not exist or survive well without communism propaganda. These similarities and the emergence of collective memories have created a strong discourse on the ghost of communism believed to have encouraged the mass killings at the beginning of the New Order (*Reference: After the 1965 coup, the military and its supporters from the nationalist and Muslim organizations killed hundreds of thousands to millions of people who was accused to be PKI supporters and/or affiliates [24]*).

Kompas took editorial steps that were recorded in the *article titles* to adapt to the topic of communism, both because of pressure from the authorities, as well as what emerged from the ideology of Kompas as media. This research records several changes in the

editorials regarding the topic of communism of the Kompas Daily from 1965 to 1967.

The research shows that from June 25, 1965 to March 13, 1967, there were at least 46 articles of Kompas Daily that wrote about the issues of the PKI, communists and other terms that has the same meaning, such as leftist ideology, extreme leftism, and subversion, which was used by the New Order to legitimize the prohibition of communism in the Republic of Indonesia.

2. Materials and Methods

2.1. Methods

This research method uses a qualitative research paradigm with a constructivist approach. Data were collected from the mass media, research studies, publications, online technology, interviews, and academic literature related to the practice of communism discourse in the Kompas Daily. [6] states that research with the constructivist paradigm is directed to produce various reconstructive understandings in which there are characteristics such as trustworthiness and authenticity.

In this study, the researcher used a literature study or literature research. According to [15], literature research is a series of activities related to the methods of collecting library data, reading and taking notes, and managing research materials. Researchers use this type of research to obtain data and information by examining written sources such as textbooks, biographies, and journals that are relevant to the title to be studied.

A literature study was conducted to identify publications that have qualifications based on the scientific method and can be used to identify the context of the events studied in this study. The literature study conducted by the authors resulted in hundreds of books, journals, and editorial articles in the Kompas Daily throughout 1965–1967, which were eventually re-filtered before being used to add to the literary treasures in this study, while other sources are obtained from books related to events relevant to the selected timeline.

This study also uses the Historiography method. Historiography is defined as a study of historical writing. According [10], historical writing is used to explain the phases of an event, although it also sometimes shows historical differentiation and proof through various historians' writings on certain themes., it is almost certain to find a perspective that has differences from one writing to another in every historical writing because history is unique, and can be written individually or as an institution.

[10] describes the historical method as a set of systematic principles and rules to help effectively collect historical source materials (heuristics), evaluate

them critically, present a synthesis, and write down the results achieved (exposition). This latter method makes these steps known as historiography.



Fig. 1 Main steps of the research process [10]

From the documentation research of Kompas Daily, from the day Kompas Newspaper was born, June 25, 1965 to March 13, 1967, the day when Soeharto was appointed as interim president to replace Soekarno, there were at least 46 editorials of Kompas Daily. This editorial raised the issue of PKI, communism, and other terms that had been used, either as political support during the Soekarno era, or as a political tool by Soeharto to weaken Soekarno's power when the New Order came to power.

The following are examples of editorials from each order collected by the researcher.

Table 1 Selected editorials of Kompas Daily 1965–1967
(Developed by the authors)

No.	Editorials	Date of issue
1	The Birth of Kompas	June 28, 1965
2	Dwikora volunteer	July 9, 1965
3	From Cairo for Nasakom Internationalization	July 10, 1965
4	Five Talismans	July 13, 1965
5	Nasakom is our soul	July 22, 1965
6	Cooperation between the Party and ABRI	July 30, 1965
7	Theory and Honesty	Aug. 13, 1965
8	Nasakom requirements	Oct. 1, 1965
9	Donot counter the revolution	Oct. 6, 1965
10	Donot hold grudges	Oct. 7, 1965
11	People's Union and ABRI	Oct. 9, 1965
12	Wolf, mouse deer and goat	Oct. 13, 1965
13	Unjustified Destruction	Oct. 15, 1965
14	The Counter-Revolutionary Purge	Oct. 18, 1965
15	Seeing the future	Oct. 27, 1965
16	Don't Forget Pancasila	Nov. 1, 1965
17	Perda Jaya Instructions	Nov. 4, 1965
18	Baperki problem	Nov. 12, 1965
19	The revolution devours its own children	Nov. 22, 1965
20	Cause of the G30S	Nov. 23, 1965
21	Slander	Nov. 25, 1965
22	Without the PKI, the Revolution Was More Successful	Dec. 2, 1965
23	Dialog	Jan. 11, 1966
24	Politics and Guerrilla	Feb. 10, 1966
25	Mahmilub	Feb. 14, 1966
26	General Soeharto's warning	Feb. 19, 1966
27	New Hope	Mar. 9, 1966
28	Salus Populi Suprema Lex	Mar. 14, 1966
29	Recognizing Responsibility	April 11, 1966
30	Honesty	May 10, 1966
31	MPRS Must Be Accountable	June 22, 1966
32	Old Order and New Order	July 4, 1966
33	People are more progressive than their leaders	July 5, 1966
34	ABRI statement	July 8, 1966
35	General Soeharto's statement	Aug. 26, 1966
36	TNI in the New Order	Sep. 2, 1966
37	Bung Karno's teachings	Sep. 24, 1966
38	Gestapu, Pancasila, New Order	Sep. 28, 1966

Continuation of Table 1

39	Pancasila	Oct. 1, 1966
40	Soebandrio Sentenced to Death	Oct. 27, 1966
41	Arbitrariness	Dec. 2, 1966
42	Soekarno rejected the New Order	Dec. 16, 1966
43	Nuddin Lubis's resolution	Feb. 6, 1967
44	The fall of President Soekarno	Feb. 20, 1967
45	The sincerity of President Soekarno	Feb. 28, 1967
46	President Soeharto	Mar. 13, 1967

2.2. Theory

The role of mass media in the process of social construction of reality holds a central place in communication research. Despite the diversity of conceptualizations and methodologies in the studies dealing with this topic, two basic approaches can be distinguished. The first focuses on the social construction of reality as an important aspect of the relationship between culture and society. The second approach concentrates on the social construction of reality as a type of media effect [4].

The definition of [4] has direct implications for the study of culture and mass communication. They postulate that in contemporary culture, the social construction of reality is strongly influenced by the mass media. Media shape individual and collective consciousness by organizing and circulating the knowledge people have about their own daily lives and about the more distant contexts of their lives.

The reality construction process can only be done through social interaction, both real and symbolic. The social construction of reality is a dialectical process in which humans act both as creators and as products of their social world. This is a consequence of the special human ability to externalize and objectify the meanings, experiences, and actions that are internalized by a person.

Mass media are referred to explain the conceptual relationship between their theory and media research. The extent of the media's contribution to the construction of individual reality depends on one's direct experience with various phenomena and the consequent dependence on the media for information about these phenomena.

Another question relevant to the interaction between symbolic and objective reality is who is responsible for and determines the construction of reality in media content. According to [19], this is due to the relationship between the organizational structure of the media and objective reality and the interaction between culture and other societal structures.

The authors of [4] mention that the media contribute to the agenda of issues that are considered important by the public and political elites. From a macrosocial perspective, the fact that during elections, the mass media put politics at the top of the agenda demonstrates the power of the media to define the framework within which collective social realities are perceived, and consequently to shape public opinion.

This research also uses the collective memory theory. Collective memory is a trace of the past that is remembered and revived in the present, periodically brought back to life in commemorations, celebrations, poems, writings, pictures, and other symbolic displays. According to [11], in society, humans usually acquire their collective memory. In society, they also remember, recognize, and localize their memories. [11] sees in this symbolic system as important markers of group solidarity, but it is in the space in between, in the absence of tangible symbols, that collective memory limits group membership and group meaning. Having to be recreated, the collective memory of the past is subject to the social forces of the present because collective identity must be empowered and must be imbued as a social force today.

As for the issue of communism in the media, the successful efforts of the army marked the collapse of the Old Order to blame the coup attempt on the PKI and continue its campaign to eliminate communism and leftist thought in Indonesia. The new regime (New Order) emphasized the centrality of anti-communism ideas through indoctrination programs operating through the media, workplace, and education system.

The New Order created and evoked memories through a campaign that portrayed the army under General Soeharto as the great savior of a nation that was on the verge of collapse [33]. The New Order not only justified the rise of power in the sense of suppressing communism, but deliberately maintained a sense of danger, and ignited fears of a repeat of the events of 1965–66, as a mechanism of social control [14]. The term 'communist' can be attached to anyone or anything, and is a product of fear of the threat of communism.

An individual's memory is always based on the collectivity of which he is a part of, such as religion, family, ethnic community, and so on. Thus, an individual depends on the groups and communities of which he is a part to transmit the collective memory of the group to him. Collective memory in this sense, refers to socially framed individual memories or aggregated individual memories.

2.3. Communism in Indonesia

Hendricus Josephus Franciscus Marie Sneevliet was a major actor in the emergence of Communism in Indonesia. His deep understanding and sympathy for Asian nationalism and his direct experience in the communist movement in China made him a pioneer of communism in several Asian countries, including Indonesia [5]. Henk Sneevliet was born in Rotterdam in 1883. From an early age, he was involved in the Dutch socialist movement, and in 1902, he joined the Dutch Social Democratic Workers Party. His journey from the Netherlands to the Dutch East Indies in 1913 changed his life.

Sneevliet only needed four years in the Dutch East Indies to make an impact with the socialist ideology he brought. In May 1914, Sneevliet founded the pioneers of the PKI and the first Marxist Party, the Indies Social Democratic Association (ISDA). ISDA's move was quite progressive and it immediately influenced the Rail and Tram Workers Union (RTWU).

Under the influence and direction of Sneevliet through the ISDA, the RTWU developed into modern, well-organized union. Since 1915, its membership consisted mostly of Indonesians and would have a major influence on the further development of the Indonesian labor movement [22]. When, in 1920, the Indies Kommunist Union (later renamed the PKI) was formed, the RTWU provided the core of support in which the party grew.

Because of the teachings of Sneevliet, the PKI grew by giving birth to progressive young figures at that time, such as Darsono, Semaoen, Musso, Alimin, Misbach, Tan Malaka, and Mas Marco Kartodikromo to the younger generation, Dipa Nusantara Aidit, Njoto and Lukman. The many rebellions carried out by the PKI in the colonial era drove thousands of communists into exile. One of the exile places was the Boven-Digoel political prison, which was built in 1927 specifically to hinder the communist movement.

After these arrests, the communists disappeared, although their regeneration continued. 20 years later, the communists again launched a rebellion in 1948. In an atmosphere of the struggle to maintain independence, the PKI declared the establishment of the Soviet Republic of Indonesia. Amir Syarifuddin's disappointment triggered this rebellion because his cabinet was overthrown and Musso's return in August 1948 from exile in the Soviet Union; Musso was one of the PKI leaders since the 1920s [29].

The government, fearful of the threat of possible disintegration in the young Republic of Indonesia, immediately responded with a military operation to seize the city of Madiun, which was in the hands of what government leaders called rebels. The Siliwangi Division of the army spearheaded this operation, and quickly recaptured Madiun City on September 30, 1948. During the three months of confrontation, a battle between the PKI led by Musso against the Indonesian army continued throughout most of the Central and East Java. Although the exact number of victims is never known, the conflict is estimated to have claimed thousands of lives and brought destruction and violence to the affected areas.

Military operations continued until November 1948. While it is difficult to determine when the Madiun Rebellion actually ended by December, most of the leaders of the People's Democratic Front (PDF) had been killed in guerrilla warfare or captured and executed by the Indonesian government. At that time, the PDF was in disarray, without leadership and had

lost its status as an organized opposition. On September 30, 1948, at 16:15 the army retook the city of Madiun [1].

Even though the communist rebellion was thwarted, the Indonesian government did not prohibit the development of communist ideology, the internal leadership of the PKI used this loophole to consolidate the organization. Within 7 years, young PKI leaders who took over the party succeeded in placing the PKI as a top political party in the 1955 General Election. The years of the PKI's development were essential to scholars of modern Indonesian history, as well as to those who studied international communism. The PKI shows many characteristics that are often overlooked but remain strong in Indonesian politics.

A strategy used by the PKI was the 'cultural change' strategy. The revival of the PKI began in the early 1950s, when the young generation took over the party leadership, which at that time was a weak and demoralized party. The astute maneuvering of a trio of young leaders: Aidit, Lukman, and Njoto succeeded in building a more modern PKI, providing opportunities for new cadres and implementing unconventional party strategies.

The emergence of new leadership, the restoration of the communist movement in general, and the development of organizational and cultural activities within and around the movement, became the key to the rise of communism in 1948. Its contribution to Indonesian politics has made the PKI a political party with the largest mass base in Indonesia in the 1960s [20].

Before the coup events of September 30, 1965, the PKI was the largest Communist organization in a non-communist state. With around three million members, they could mobilize 15 million members of workers, farmers, youth, women, students, cultural workers, university teachers, and even village officials. President Soekarno at home and major Communist parties abroad respected Aidit, Lukman, and Njoto, the triumvirate who had led the party since January 1951.

After the events of September 30, 1965, the situation was very different. The massive organization of the PKI was quickly and bloodily destroyed. Among the hundreds of thousands to millions of people who died were Aidit, Lukman, and Njoto, as well as most of the lower cadres [24]. Many party activists were imprisoned without trial for their involvement in the PKI. In March 1966 the PKI and its mass organizations were officially banned, and by July the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly proposed a ban on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism (*Reference: Provisional People's Consultative Assembly is an ad hoc national representative assembly (1959–1971) established based on Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959. The decree is a response to the perceived failure of liberal democracy, where there were 7*

administrative cabinets within 9 years (1950–1959).

Communists and suspected communist sympathizers have been removed from the national ministries, state governments, and many of the semi-representative councils originally developed under Soekarno's Guided Democracy. Most of the government ministers, who before the coup attempt showed a leaning toward PKI, such as former Foreign Minister/Vice Prime Minister I and Soebandrio, were replaced. Some of them were arrested, and most importantly, President Soekarno's role as the main protector of the PKI at that time, was politically removed. (*Reference: Soekarno did not want to dissolve the PKI because this party was integral to the Nasakom ideology. On several occasions, he rejected the desire to disband the PKI for very personal reasons, especially regarding his pride, because he had already introduced Nasakom to international politics.*)

The PKI then became a ghost or terror that is always revived through the narratives built since the New Order (1967–1998). Despite the banning of PKI in Indonesia and the 1998 political transition from the New Order to the Reform Order, there is still a taboo of mentioning communism. The practice of labeling negative things using the word "communist" has become deeply entrenched in the fabric of society in Indonesia even now.

2.4. Nationalism-Religion-Communism (Nasakom)

Soekarno's ideology in framing nationalism was his main source of strength in building Indonesia. Soekarno often used or improvised based on the needs and political escalation that developed at that time. Soekarno took and applied a Marxist analysis of resistance to imperialism, to unite the nation against colonialism, which was considered to be the scourge of national awakening. Simultaneously, Soekarno also used other ideologies as an element of balance in the early era of democracy in Indonesia.

Soekarno's Guided Democracy System from 1959–1966 brought a period of conflict to Indonesia. One of the reasons that caused controversy at that time was the birth of the term *Nasakom* (*Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme – Nationalism-Religion-Communism*), a concept invented by Soekarno in the 1920s. However, its existence only reappeared during the Indonesian revolution against imperialism and neocolonialism in the 1960s. The Nasakom concept is an attempt by the government to integrate three major political ideologies, namely nationalism, religion, and communism. The presence of the ideology of communism was then considered a problem [1].

Soekarno carried out numerous similar experiments to balance the various elements positioned against each other in practical politics at the elite level, as well as at the grassroots level. In this very unstable situation, Soekarno launched the concept of Nationalism,

Religion, and Communism in 1959. Soekarno also positioned himself as a symbol of unity and unification between nationalism, religion, and communism.

Religion has existed for a long time in Indonesian history. This element can be traced from various indigenous religions to the arrival of the process of Indianization, Arabization, and Europeanization, each of which brought its own religion: Hinduism and Buddhism from India, Islam from Arabia (initially through North and South India, then directly from Arabia) and finally Christianity (Catholic and Protestant) from Europe. Thus, religious elements have existed since the beginning of the history of the archipelago [30].

The emergence of nationalism in Indonesia is generally said to have started since the existence of tribal awareness among the local kings of the archipelago, although it is still limited to local awareness, such as awareness of Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, or Sulawesi, etc. Even within the big islands, there are also several small and competitive sultanates. However, such early local awareness was sufficient as the basis for the movement against European imperialism (Netherlands, England). Later in its historical development, nationalism awareness is based on ethnic awareness.

Significant changes occurred in the early 20th century. Due to mismanagement of the colonial government, conditions in the Dutch East Indies at that time created extreme poverty and the danger of starvation threatened the people. This situation led to strong criticism of the colonial government from the Dutch public. In fact, this condition also led to writings and criticism through articles entitled "Max Havellar" by Eduard Douwes Dekker (Multatuli) and "Suiker Contracten" by Van de Putte. A former lawyer and colonial official named Conrad Thomas van Deventer through his work entitled "An honorable debt" was published in the journal *de Gide* in 1899 in the Netherlands [3].

The ethical politics of van Deventer had a great influence in changing colonial politics. Van Deventer's proposal in principle was that the Dutch government owed Indonesia a lot. This ethical policy approach then led to the issuance of the Decentralization Law on December 20, 1904. The Decentralization Act referred to two main objectives, namely, improving the welfare of the indigenous population and gradually growing political autonomy and decentralization in the Dutch East Indies. Nationalism grew along with the level of education and economic awareness because of the implementation of ethical politics in the Dutch East Indies. Since then, a sense of nationalism began to exist and became an important factor in the history of the national movement toward independence.

The communist factor is a relatively new element in the Nasakom combination. In Europe, communist

thought emerged and internationally spread after the industrial revolution in England. Its great figures were Karl Marx and Engels, who proclaimed their Communist Manifesto in 1848. Communism and Marxism flourished throughout Europe, including the Netherlands. In Russia, it became the official state ideology and system of government after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. From the Dutch, this idea came and spread in Indonesia. One of the main actors who brought this idea to Indonesia was a Dutch man named Hendricus Josephus Franciscus Marie Sneevliet. Since 1917, communism began to exist in Indonesia and became one of the driving factors in the struggle for independence [4].

A big difference exists between these three factors in Indonesia's early modern history. They influence the political map of the archipelago toward independence. The categorization and role of this ideological-political triangle had been made from the beginning by Soekarno. In 1926, Soekarno had written that three main ideological compounds united all political organizations in Indonesia. The three major ideologies are Nationalism, Islam (representing Religion), and Marxism.

At that time, it was described only as an outline map of Indonesian political thought globally and in general. In the sixties, Soekarno proclaimed this idea as a new political doctrine in the form of the acronym *Nasakom*. Soekarno initially designed it as a binding ideology for the nation in its formative stage, although in the end, *Nasakom* failed along with the collapse of the Old Order.

2.5. Government Period in Indonesia

Overall, the government of the Republic of Indonesia since independence in 1945 is divided into 3 periods, namely, the Old Order, the New Order, and the Reformation Order. Different regime characteristics, especially in the fields of politics, democracy, and socio-cultural characterize each order.

The Old Order was a periodization marked by the government of President Soekarno from 1945 to 1966. President Soekarno ruled the government using two types of constitutions, namely, the 1945 Constitution and the 1950 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. At that time, Indonesia underwent a transition and had used multiple governmental systems, namely, Parliamentary Government (1945–1950), Liberal Democracy (1950–1959), and Guided Democracy (1959–1966). Guided democracy is democratic only in its name. It is an authoritarian system where all decisions and thoughts are centered on President Soekarno.

The number of rebellions outside of Java in the early 1960s made the army's role very dominant under Soekarno's Guided Democracy. The United States sponsored many of these rebellions after Soekarno

drew closer to the Soviet Union and China. The failure of Western-style liberal democracy and the rise of the PKI increasingly pushed President Soekarno to the left both domestically and internationally.

Apart from the military, Soekarno's Guided Democracy also relied on a complex political network around the nationalist Indonesian National Party (INP), PKI, and Islamic parties. Soekarno pitted these parties against one another, while at the same time also pitted the largely anti-communist military against the PKI.

The guided democratic government system officially began after President Soekarno announced a presidential decree on July 5, 1959. During the Guided Democracy period, major events occurred in Indonesia. This was due to the political competition between the powerful factions in the government, the Army, the President, and the PKI. The Old Order regime was a civilian authoritarian pattern when Soekarno decided to dissolve the parliamentary system and build a very unstable coalition of antagonistic social groups between the army, religious groups, and the communists [21]. This competition climaxed with the coup of September 30, 1965.

Because of the 1965 coup, the New Order emerged. The coup marked the process of government transition from President Soekarno to Acting President Lt. Gen. Soeharto. Through the mechanism of the MPRS (People's Consultative Assembly of Indonesia) Special Session, General Soeharto was finally officially confirmed as President.

Soeharto's New Order regime used violence and authoritarianism to hide behind democracy. One of them is the mass killings of 1965–1966 using armed violence [21]. After the 1965 coup, military forces with their Muslim and nationalist supporters killed hundreds of thousands to millions of people who were considered members, or identified without ever being proven as supporters, of the PKI. Military violence supported directly this period under the New Order government was by [32].

At the beginning of his reign, Soeharto's New Order removed Soekarno's ideology from foreign and domestic policies. Economic rehabilitation and development became the main goals of his government, while establishing a New Order version of democracy: Soeharto's own version of Pancasila Democracy, with himself as the leader and head of state (*Reference: Pancasila Democracy is a state system that was introduced by the 1945 Constitution. This system was put on hold from 1950 to 1959 when Liberal Democracy was activated by 1950 Provisional Constitution. Through the 1959 Presidential Decree, the 1945 Constitution was reactivated; however, Pancasila Democracy was still on hold and substituted by Guided Democracy and did not restore fully until 1972*). Soeharto also headed the executive branch as well as the cabinet, whose members he chose. The

legislature is now returned to the House of Representatives.

A notable difference is how Soeharto empowered the army within this New Order version of democracy. In addition to providing national defense, Indonesian defense forces or ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces), was ordered to fulfill socio-political roles (*Reference: At this turbulent time, ABRI consisted of four branches: army, navy, air force, and police force. Before the regime change, the main political forces were the army, the PKI, and President Soekarno. The air force was allegedly close to the PKI, whereas the navy and police forces were not politically involved. Thus, with the fall of PKI and Soekarno, the army has the strongest political power in Indonesia politics*). An Army seminar was held in August 1966 to develop and legitimize the role ABRI would play in Soeharto's New Order. This Seminar on August 25, 1966 issued the Outlines of the Policy and Implementation Plan for Political Stabilization of the Army [31].

The seminar also introduced a new doctrine for the army, namely the *Tri Ubaya Cakti* Doctrine that confirmed the dual function of the Armed Forces and resulted in many important breakthroughs that were later officially ratified by the 1966 MPRS, among others, stating that the non-military functions of ABRI members, as citizens and revolutionaries who are Pancasilaist, must be recognized and have their continuity ensured [25].

With the dual function of ABRI, the army played a bigger role both as military and social force. It began a process of internal consolidation that culminated in an extensive reorganization in the 1969–1970 and emerged as the nation's dominant political institution, forming the power base for the Soeharto government. Since 1967, the New Order government has explicitly tried to incorporate their own interpretation of Pancasila within national policies and practices to accommodate their own interests.

The rationalization of the party system in 1973, for example, was a step toward Pancasila democracy. This went on until the fall of the New Order in 1998.

3. Results and Discussion

Kompas Daily, at the beginning of its birth, was a print media intended as a tool of the Catholic Party to compete with the popularity of *Harian Rakjat*, which was affiliated with the PKI. At that time, *Harian Rakjat* was an influential media with a very large number of readers.

The Kompas Daily later experienced difficulties due to political pressure during the Old Order era in 1965. At that time, Soekarno united nationalists, religious and communists under one Nasakom flag to balance the political power that existed in the Old Order era. Being under one flag, the authoritarian nature of Guided Democracy makes it difficult for each element in

Nasakom to develop and express their political views separately. Soekarno at the time isolated himself from the western world and ideology, a series of events marked this, including Indonesia's exit from the United Nations in 1963 [16]. Soekarno preferred to build a relationship with Socialist and Communist states such as China, North Korea, and the USSR. This has helped the PKI gain closeness to Soekarno and helped them flourish.

Through Soekarno, Nasakom was used as a tool for political propaganda, which was channeled by Soekarno through many mediums, one of which was the mass media and their obligation to support the revolution, as Soekarno often said [9]. Kompas Daily, like it or not, is a part of that revolution, and as a consequence through their editorials, Kompas inevitably supports Nasakom and other visions of the Old Order. The first editorial of Kompas after the 30th September Movement was published on October 6, 1965, and called the public to stay calm and trust the government. This call is needed considering there was an escalation of public unrest and confusion about the events on 30th September.

On the 2nd of October 1965, the army banned all media outlets from publishing or broadcasting. The army mainstreamed all information through the Angkatan Bersenjata Daily and Berita Yudha, which had an affiliation with the military. The ban was lifted on October 6, when public unrest has been steadily increasing. Kompas Daily responded to the public by printing news that clarified some rumors about the army involvement in the 30th September Movement. Kompas also later published official information from the Head of the Information Center for the Indonesian Army, Brigadier General Ibnu Subroto [26].

The Kompas editorial supported the army's view that the perpetrators of the September 30th Movement were "political adventurers and counter-revolutionaries." The people were asked to "defend the truth consistently and at any cost," implicitly referring to the 5-day information ban and the military's version of truth that accused the PKI as the main actor of the September 30th Movement. Through this editorial, the Kompas Daily, which 5 days earlier had glorified communism through the jargon of Nasakom, has suddenly turned against and accused the PKI of being behind the September 30th Movement. However, Kompas also asked the people to continue to believe in Soekarno as the great leader of the revolution to eradicate the counter-revolutionary forces that carried out the September 30th Movement. Kompas Daily believes that the situation will get better because this is not the first time Indonesia has experienced a rebellion.

Two important statements were after the events of September 30 issued by two central figures in the politics of the Republic of Indonesia at that time. The first is President Soekarno's message after the plenary

session of the Dwikora cabinet on October 6, 1965, at the Bogor Presidential Palace. Soekarno asked all parties to hold back and not hold grudges over the killings and appointed several high-ranking army officers to improve the situation. The officers appointed were Major General Pranoto Reksosamudro to assume administrative control of the military, and Major General Soeharto to assume technical control of the military, security, and order.

The second statement was made the day before, through a speech at the burial ceremony of 7 army officers killed during the September 30th Movement, conducted by the Armed Forces Chief, General Abdul Haris Nasution on October 5, 1965 in front of the Army Headquarters, in Jakarta. This incident seriously affecting the morale of the Indonesian Army, as recorded in Abdul Haris Nasution's speech, because the burial was on the Armed Forces birthday. In this speech, General Nasution in a trembling voice stated that the Armed Forces would not back down against the PKI and would continue the struggle of the officers who were killed [23].

Kompas Daily also helps its readers in mapping the events of the September 30th Movement. Kompas Daily uses the analogy of the Wolf, Mouse Deer, and Goat to map the involved parties. Wolves are parties who plan and have big aspirations for their political struggle, Mouse Deer is an opportunist group who takes advantage of adversities, and the last is the Goat as a victim who is dragged by the current without knowing what the case is. According to Kompas Daily, the people are smart enough to identify which figures belong to the three groups.

The mass media continuously blamed the PKI and this information instigated violence from the people who began destroying and confiscating the properties of PKI leaders. Kompas Daily reminded the importance of maintaining unity and integrity, and rejecting violence while expressing understanding over the people's anger toward the PKI. In representing the anger of the people, Kompas reminded the government of the previous political betrayal of the PKI and indirectly asked the government to consider the dissolving of the PKI.

This stance is notable because Kompas support for communism as a part of Nasakom was evident from the beginning of their publication, even until early November 1965, two months after the September 30 Movement, despite the military allegation against the PKI as the face of communism to be the party responsible for the movement. In an editorial in Nov., Kompas Daily elaborates that communism should not be exclusively tied to the PKI. Kompas echoes Soekarno's understanding that as a 'leftist movement', communism was the opposition to western world imperialism, as he wrote in the book *Under the Flag of the Revolution* [28].

Along with the political development, seen in the decline of Soekarno's Old Order, the antagonization of the PKI, and the rise of the military, the Kompas Daily took a safe position and adopted an editorial policy that swung between two clashing powers at that time. Kompas publicly denounced communism as a support for the military that was politically strong at that time (Soeharto), while simultaneously Kompas also honored Soekarno by providing a defense from those blaming him for the "betrayal" of the PKI, considering Soekarno was very close to the now political pariah.

Significant changes in the editorial policy of Kompas were observed in January 1966, when protests against Soekarno's leadership were so massive. At that time, Indonesia had entered a phase of polarization between those who supported Nasakom and those who did not. These were against Nasakom continued to increase in number because of the military's tactical steps to control issues in the mass media, by constructing an idea of communists, not just the PKI, as the perpetrators of the September 30th Movement and its atrocities. In this polarized confrontational environment, it is very difficult to find a solution to the tensions traditionally available in Indonesian culture.

To ease the tension, President Soekarno gave order to Lieutenant General Soeharto through called *Supersemar* (the Order of Eleventh of March) to "keep the stability of the country and the dignity of the executive branch." This happened after a massive student demonstration occurred in front of the State Palace on March 11, later found to be supported by the army. On the afternoon of March 11, 1966, at the Bogor Palace, Soekarno signed the warrant [8]. The orders listed in *Supersemar* received full support from the Kompas Daily, although the Kompas Daily never received a copy of the original letter. *Supersemar* later became a marker of the beginning of transfer of power from Soekarno's Old Order to Soeharto's New Order. After *Supersemar*, support for the New Order by Kompas editorial became full, Kompas Daily was behind the New Order in conducting the mandate of the people who were disappointed with the Old Order government.

According to Kompas Daily, President Soekarno did not respond to the people's demands to ban PKI, but instead putting blame to the people involved in criminal acts after the September 30th Movement. President Soekarno also rejected accusations that the PKI was involved and did not want to condemn the PKI. In contrast, President Soekarno continued to propagate Nasakom. Kompas Daily assessed that Soekarno put too much emphasis on personal interests, which were sometimes not in accordance with the wishes of the people.

According to Kompas, Soekarno's policies caused the failure of the Old Order, which tended to sideline the public interest, while creating policies that put

personal and group interests first with the façade of public interest, creating vested interest. The issue of vested interest is also often raised in rallies and dialogues carried out by the New Order camp to discredit Soekarno as the person in charge of the Old Order.

The early period of the New Order was marked by acts of armed and ideological violence, carried out by the New Order, and later these actions were criticized for violating human rights. The danger and threat of the rise of communism against the regime will later become a slogan that the New Order government always carries. During more than 30 years in power, the New Order implemented various policies to prevent the revival of the communist ideology. This incident led to one of the worst bloodshed of the 20th century, hundreds of thousands to millions of people were massacred for alleged involvement in communism by the army and its affiliated militias, especially in Central Java, East Java, and Bali.

Communism never died in the New Order. The latent danger of communism became a well-known slogan, even after the collapse of the New Order. The ABRI Center for History and Tradition even published four volumes of books on the history of the PKI: Latent Dangers of Communism in Indonesia, to strengthen the foundation of belief in the threat of communism. The New Order's anti-communist campaign resulted in various attempts to stamp out the slightest signs that could be seen as an attempt to revive communism [14].

Starting at the end of 1966, Kompas began making light criticisms or bring up questions that were on the minds of the people. ABRI's enormous role at the beginning of the New Order made it necessary for Kompas to raise an editorial on the vision that *the Supersemar* mandate holder, Soeharto, would bring about Indonesia. Concerns about the fall of Indonesia into the hands of a militaristic dictator have been circulating since mid-1966. The New Order has not denied this. Several times, both Soeharto and officials in the New Order era emphasized that Indonesia would not become a state based on military dictatorship, even though at the time the ABRI elements took over almost every important function in post-*Supersemar* Indonesia. Rumors about the existence of a military dictatorship were dismissed while mentioning that the issue was a political movement from pro-communism people [18].

Kompas Daily confirmed the public's concerns, but gave them the peace of mind because their concern was not a concept of militarism, but the abuse of individual power. This should have been avoided if power was obtained from the system, and supervised by all elements of democracy that were not functioning in the Old Order regime. Kompas considered the guarantee of a democratic state expressed in Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution a source of peace for the people,

especially because the two principles above are also the basis of the ABRI Doctrine. The difference between ABRI and the people is only the weapons attached to every soldier who enforced the New Order over the betrayal of the September 30th Movement.

Kompas expressed that the public should support all elements of ABRI. However, Kompas also reminded ABRI, from the top leadership to the lowest rank, to be open to criticism from the public. The trust given by the Indonesians and the mass media is actually an irony, considering that 32 years later after the end of the New Order regime, Soeharto's Java-centric centralistic government is considered as a militaristic dictatorship.

Kompas also criticized the excessive use of anti-PKI slogans. The ghost of communism, as Kompas Daily wrote, was not only used by the New Order government to maintain a deep-seated public hatred of communism, but the New Order government also supported this to reinforce or justify its actions. In Kompas Daily's estimation, what the New Order government did by constantly mentioning the ghost of communism was about the same as what the Old Order did by constantly mentioning neocolonialism and imperialism, they are both creating a common enemy. Kompas considers that the excessive use of anti-communism jargon is counterproductive. The authorities deflect all issues arising to be the fault of communists and communism, instead of giving correct information to the public.

The ghost of communism became too cheaply used for any wrongdoing that came up. If this continues, society will become apathetic to the real latent dangers that still exist. The terms used by officials were eventually imitated by the public. For political or social interests, the issue of Communist Ghosts and involvement with the Old Order were also often used. The people know that anything labeled as PKI or the Old Order will immediately receive legal and social attention. Kompas were not unaware of the latent danger, and the excessive use of slogans will only make Indonesia fall back into the same mistake that was created by the Old Order.

4. Conclusion

The editorial of Kompas Daily regarding communism during the transition periods has always moved dynamically, sometimes positioning itself to support the government, but at other times also criticizing government policies. This can be seen in the editorial writings of Kompas Daily during the Old Order and New Order, when Kompas Daily tried to continue to adapt to the political situation. The swing journalism practiced by Kompas is successful in positioning this media safely, without losing its editorial independence. Kompas has proven that it can survive the authoritarian rule of the regime, especially

in the Old Order and the New Order.

Kompas Daily in the Old Order maneuvered by initially supporting the Old Order under Soekarno to become the media that criticized Soekarno after the September 30th Movement. However, Kompas Daily did it gradually. Before finally when the military force that replaced the Old Order was strong enough, Kompas Daily began to dare to openly support it, even harshly criticizing Soekarno. Kompas Daily began to break away from the influence of the Old Order, which was simultaneously being weakened by the military.

Before the New Order was strong enough, Kompas continued to write and support Soekarno's ideology. Although at the same time, Kompas also gave a positive editorial to the policies of the New Order. Finally, after the military power that became the core of the New Order was strong enough, Kompas began to dare to openly support, even criticize Soekarno. At the beginning, Kompas was quite close to the New Order, even supporting the military operation to eliminate the September 30th Movement. In fact, this military operation carried out by the armed forces shows human rights violations.

This research proves that the mass media, including Kompas Daily, will try to adapt when dealing with power. This adaptation is an attempt to survive in a situation that is unideal for the mass media. This situation happened during the Old Order and the transition to the New Order.

The limitation in this study is the possibility of bias in the researcher's analysis, especially in interpreting sources. Because historical research relies on data from the past, there is no way to ascertain the true perspective of the actors. Researchers are very open to this difference and hope that there will be further research on this topic to provide a more comprehensive scope.

Similar research can also be done with other media subjects besides Kompas Daily on the issue of communism. Although not many media have survived as long as Kompas Daily, other research can be done for other media that have a reputation and experienced editors and journalists.

The issue of communism in Indonesia can still be an interesting issue. Absence of rules that could break the negative collective memory of communism built by the New Order caused this. The media and politicians who use the media to raise hatred always against communism can exploit this resistance to communism.

Kompas Daily showed its vision that was in accordance with the journalistic values brought by Jakob Oetama and P.K Ojong, namely, to play a role in educating and enlightening the conscience of the community. Because of this unique journalistic style, Kompas can survive in various government regimes. The editorial pendulum of Kompas Daily can swing more often to Kompas-style journalism, no longer

playing it safe and approaching power, as tended to happen during the Old Order and New Order.

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