Political Party Interaction Strategies in Auditing Election Campaign Funding Reports in Indonesia

Henry Windrianto Darmoko, Herry Purnomo

Abstract

This research aims to explore the interaction strategies used by political parties as auditees when accepting auditors from public accounting firms in the process of auditing political party campaign funds. In the context of political party audits, the interaction model of the political parties being audited has never been studied before. This research employs a qualitative method with an interpretive paradigm. This study identifies three dimensions of political parties that influence their interaction strategies when facing auditors of Campaign Fund Reports, namely: 1. attention of the political party’s central leadership board, 2. constituents of political parties at the district/city level, and 3. achievement status from the head of a political party at the district/city level. The research findings conclude five interaction strategies undertaken by the auditee teams of political parties in facing electoral campaign fund auditors: Accommodating, Collaborating, Compromising, Avoiding, and Encountering. These five interaction strategies are influenced by three dimensions of political parties, as follows: 1. Political parties with high attention, high constituency, and low achievement employ the Collaborating strategy. 2. Political parties with high attention, high constituency, and high achievement employ the Compromising strategy. 3. Political parties with low attention, high constituency, and High Achievement Status employ the Collaborating strategy. 4. Political parties with low attention, high constituency, and low achievement employ the Encountering strategy. 5. Political parties with high attention, low constituency, and Low Achievement Status employ the Accommodating strategy. 6. Political parties with high attention, low constituency, and high achievement status employ the Collaborating strategy. 7. Political parties with low attention, low constituency, and high achievement status employ the Accommodating strategy. 8. Political parties with low attention, low constituent, and low achievement status employ the Avoidance strategy.

 

Keywords: political party audits, interaction strategies, campaign fund accountability

 

https://doi.org/10.55463/issn.1674-2974.51.6.29


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References


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